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1. Introduction 
Explanatory integration is one of the traditional aims of psychiatry, but it remains controversial how 
it should be effectively pursued (Stephan et al. 2016).1 In this paper, we examine three theoretical 
frameworks for pursuing explanatory integration in psychiatry: Kendler, Zachar & Craver’s (2011) 
mechanistic framework, Borsboom & Cramer’s (2013) network of symptoms framework, and a 
dimensional framework we are going to develop and ground in the notion of computational 
phenotype, where a computational phenotype is “a measurable behavioural or neural type defined in 
terms of some computational model” (Montague et al. 2012, 72). Considering alcohol use disorder 
(AUD) as a case study, we show that in comparison to the mechanistic and network of symptoms 
frameworks the dimensional framework is more practically useful in a variety of clinical and 
research contexts, and more adequate for integrating computational and mechanistic explanations 
with phenomenological analyses. 
 
The motivations for choosing AUD as a case study are threefold. First, AUD is a prominent 
explanatory target of computational psychiatry. Computational psychiatry aims “to enable 
integration” of explanations of mental maladies across temporal and spatial scales—from genes to 
molecules, cells, circuits, brain systems, and individual and social behaviour—“by demonstrating, 
in a mathematically rigorous way, how phenomena on one level impact phenomena on another” 
(Kurth-Nelson et al. 2016, 79). Second, AUD has distinctive genetic, neurophysiological, 
behavioural, social, and cultural correlates, as well as a rich phenomenology. Its phenomenology 
involves a sense of impaired control over drinking, delirium with delusions and hallucinations, 
“blackouts”, craving, and suffering associated with hangovers, withdrawal and social isolation (see, 
e.g., Smith 1998; Shinebourne & Smith 2009; Flanagan 2013). Third and finally, given its 
numerous correlates and its rich phenomenology, and because computational psychiatry has been 
said to “honour the values and goals of those with lived experience of psychosis” (Powers, Bien, & 
Corlett 2018, 640), AUD offers an ideal case for assessing how different theoretical frameworks can 
fruitfully integrate phenomenology, mechanism, and computation in psychiatry. 
 
2. Alcohol use disorder and phenomenology 
                                                             
1 It is worth clarifying right at the beginning what we take to constitute explanations. All explanations answer 
some why-, how-, when-, or where-question, although significant variation is observed across scientific and 
ordinary contexts in what is accepted as an explanation, in what type of explanatory information is sought, 
and in what norms are assumed to govern good explanations. This apparent variation is reflected in both the 
philosophy and psychology of explanation (Colombo 2017). For present purposes, we assume that an answer 
to a request for explanation is a good one to the extent it either unifies apparently scattered pockets of 
knowledge about the phenomenon of interest, or can be used to address counterfactual questions about what 
would happen if certain features of the phenomenon of interest were different.  
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Alcohol is one of the most widely used psychoactive, dependence-producing substances in the 
world, and is associated with several mental maladies (Connor et al. 2016; WHO 2014). According 
to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), the criteria for diagnosing 
alcohol use disorder (AUD) are the following: 
 
1. Alcohol is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period than was intended. 
2. There is a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control alcohol use. 
3. A great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain alcohol, use alcohol, or recover 
from its effects. 
4. Craving, or a strong desire or urge to use alcohol. 
5. Recurrent alcohol use resulting in a failure to fulfil major role obligations at work, school, or 
home. 
6. Continued alcohol use despite having persistent or recurrent social or inter-personal 
problems caused or exacerbated by the effects of alcohol. 
7. Important social, occupational, or recreational activities are given up or reduced because of 
alcohol use. 
8. Recurrent alcohol use in situations in which it is physically hazardous. 
9. Alcohol use is continued despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent physical or 
psychological problem that is likely to have been caused or exacerbated by alcohol. 
10. Tolerance, as defined by either of the following:  
a. A need for markedly increased amounts of alcohol to achieve intoxication or desired 
effect. 
b. A markedly diminished effect with continued use of the same amount of alcohol. 
11. Withdrawal, as manifested by either of the following: 
a. The characteristic withdrawal symptoms for alcohol... 
b. Alcohol [...] is taken to relieve or avoid withdrawal symptoms. (DSM-5, 490-1) 
 
Over history, there have been several other diagnostic criteria of alcoholism (Tabakoff & Hoffman 
2013). The items on the DSM-5 list provide us with a sufficiently typical description of key 
psychological, behavioural and social aspects of excessive alcohol consumption. Some of these 
items correlate with various risk factors for AUD, including: aggregate genetic risk factors, 
impairments in the frontal lobes and their connections with limbic regions in the brain, neuroticism 
and impulsivity, parental loss, peer alcohol use, and prices of alcoholic beverages (Kendler 2012, 
12-14). Given our purposes here, it is important to point out items 4-6 and 9 describe poor learning 
and decision-making as central features of AUD, and computational modelling of learning and 
decision-making in AUD has in fact been blooming in the last few years (e.g., Voon, Reiter, Sebold, 
& Groman 2017); items 2, 4, and 11 indicate AUD patients have expectations, perceptions, desires, 
moods, and thoughts infused with value, which can exert strong motivational power on their 
learning and decision-making. Within philosophy, these types of mental states are the targets of 
phenomenological analyses. 
 
Phenomenology is the study of structures of types of familiar intentional mental states like 
perceptions, thoughts, emotions, desires, imaginations (i.e., mental states of, or about something) as 
they are experienced from a first-person point of view (see Smith 2018 for a comprehensive 
introduction to phenomenology). One central goal is to develop a holistic account of the lived 
experience of embodied, ecologically situated agents. Within this broad and heterogeneous field of 
research, at least three methods have been adopted to study the structures of psychiatric patients’ 
experience. The first method consists in describing a type of lived experience “as it is without 
taking account of its psychological origin and the causal explanations which the scientist, the 
historian, or the sociologist may be able to provide” (Merleau-Ponty 1945/1962, vii). Jaspers 
(1913/1997), for example, provides us with detailed, comprehensive descriptions of patients’ lived 
3 
 
experiences, based on biographical information and on notes on how patients felt and thought about 
their experiences, relationships and condition. Another method adopted by phenomenologists 
consists in interpreting a type of experience by situating it in a specific social, material and 
experiential context. For example, Laing (1960) interprets the psychotic experience by situating it in 
the web of the patients’ personal relationships. His interpretation of this type experience is in terms 
of “ontological insecurity”, which is roughly a fragile sense of self impeding people’s taking for 
granted the “realness” and “meaning” of ordinary circumstances of everyday life. A third method 
consists in analysing the modal structure, and conditions of possibility, of embodied subjective 
experiences, distinguishing different features of different types of experiences. 
 
Phenomenological methods in psychiatry do not merely consist in interviewing and taking note of 
patients’ reports; they involve complex descriptive, interpretative, and analytical processes, where 
patients’ experiences are organized on the basis of specific theoretical structures (e.g. Carel 2011; 
Fuchs 2010). For example, Laing (1960) organized patients’ experiences on the basis of the 
existential structure of “ontological insecurity”, which, applied to the case of AUD, highlights that 
alcohol-dependent patients feel more unreal than real, they would feel so separated from the rest of 
the world they experience their autonomy and identity as constantly threatened, and the only escape 
from this existential despair is through the anesthetization of alcohol. While triangulating between 
multiple data sources and methods can contribute to the trustworthiness of phenomenological 
results, such as descriptions, analyses or interpretations of some mental phenomenon, the ultimate 
criterion to evaluate these results is their capacity to make sense of out-of-the-ordinary, unexpected 
experiences that cannot be readily understood in terms of more familiar knowledge structures. 
 
Phenomenological descriptions, analyses, or interpretations may not constitute explanations. After 
all, phenomenology is often characterised as a purely descriptive enterprise distinct from 
explanation. But this does not mean they are autonomous, that they cannot constrain, inform, or 
offer as source of evidence for causal, computational, or other types of explanations of mental 
maladies. In fact, phenomenological results are often used to clarify the structure of the experiences 
involved in mental maladies, to interpret experimental results, and to inspire hypotheses for further 
research (Gallagher 2004; Parnas & Sass 2008; Sass 2014). 
 
Consider AUD. One recurrent feature of phenomenological descriptions of AUD is the sense of 
powerless, helpless suffering that accompanies alcoholics’ drinking behaviour. Smith (1998), for 
example, conducted in-depth interviews with six alcohol-dependent patients, between 42 and 61 
years, in a clinic in Scotland. Using interpretative and descriptive phenomenological methods, he 
puts into focus how patients’ “[s]uffering is lived as an insidious process, a movement of ever 
decreasing circles, whose momentum accelerates you into a rapid, spiralling decline. This vortex is 
a spinning vicious circle, full of energy, yet symbolising powerlessness” (216).2 
 
Smith’s descriptions highlight the embodied suffering and experience of self-stigma associated with 
alcohol-dependent patients’ craving and alcohol withdrawal. They also draw our attention to the 
                                                             
2 Two of Smith’s (1998) participants reported: “Suffering is lived in the realization that physical sickness and 
mental pain increase with each drinking bout and that each bout is an escape from the guilt, shamefulness, 
and self-loathing set in motion by the previous one. It is lived watching yourself deteriorate in all life 
aspects, and finding yourself powerless to intervene on your own behalf... You watch helplessly as your 
addicted self sneaks out to buy more alcohol to finish the job.” (216). “Suffering is eventually lived in a state 
of depression and despair, of powerlessness to break the circle. The eye of the vortex represents the 
sufferer’s own personal rock bottom of physical, social and moral degradation” (Ibid.).  
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rigidity of behavioural patterns, where patients cannot stop drinking. When they start drinking, 
every choice they make is often un-flexibly biased towards consuming more alcohol.3 
 
Phenomenological descriptions seem to suggest that “learning to drink” consists in the acquisition 
of a rigid habit, of a behavioural pattern that is so ingrained as to make heavy drinkers insensitive to 
their motivation state and to the bodily, psychological, and social consequences of drinking. In 
acquiring a habit of drinking, goal-directed processes are likely to be involved too (Everitt & 
Robbins 2016). But, in acquiring and enacting drinking habits, the flexibility of alcohol-dependent 
individuals’ goal-directed decision processes is often reduced, as alcohol-dependent individuals’ 
repeated drinking behaviour often biases their expectations about the goodness of consuming 
alcohol. One 31 years old alcohol-dependent patient interviewed by Shinebourne and Smith (2009, 
155-6) explains how excessive alcohol consumption reconfigured her sense of self. She says: 
 
“Some big wave, you know, you just get caught with it, that’s what it used to be like, this kind of 
like helpless feeling, just having to go and get drunk almost, you know, not even particularly 
wanting to, just feeling like there’s no other way when you are in that situation. I was very much at 
sea, really, and, I didn’t feel grounded... just this flux and thought, when am I ever going to go on 
land... and even if you were sitting on the beach, you know, you’d get caught back in...” 
 
This feeling ungrounded, helplessly “caught back in by some big wave,” is also one of the recurrent 
motifs in Flanagan’s (2013) memoir of his own alcohol dependence and recovery experience. 
Relying on his personal experience, but also on literature, Flanagan discusses the myriad ways, in 
which the habit of drinking blends into one’s sense of self. For at least some alcohol-dependent 
patients, alcohol does not completely hijack their capacity for goal-directed control, but biases it 
towards drinking. Alcohol becomes part of the way they are: “Their personhood, their character, is 
constituted, in part, by a history of drinking, by a set of identifications and practices that involve 
alcohol, and that make these individuals who and what they are. Alcoholism, of this sort, at any 
rate, is a wide ecological phenomenon; it involves the deep-self” (885-6). Because drinking may be 
partly constitutive of one’s sense of self, “undoing alcoholism as a form of life, and not more 
narrowly as just a drinking problem, involves fairly radical undoing and then redoing of oneself” 
(886). It involves acquiring new habits that fill with meaning one’s understanding of own subjective 
experiences and social situation. 
 
In summary, standard diagnostic criteria of AUD indicate that bad decision-making and impaired 
learning are central features of AUD, and—as we shall see in a moment—computational models of 
learning and decision-making have been advancing our understanding of AUD. Some of the 
standard diagnostic criteria of AUD are associated with genetic, neurophysiological, behavioural, 
and social factors. Some phenomenological descriptions and analyses highlight that alcohol-
dependent patients typically experience powerlessness, suffering and self-stigma, and these 
experiences routinely accompany their drinking habits. For many patients, alcohol drinking is 
constitutive of their form of life. Undoing alcoholism would require “redoing oneself,” by acquiring 
new goals and expectations, and developing novel habits that may give a new meaning to one’s 
lived experiences. Let’s now examine how different theoretical frameworks can fruitfully integrate 
these features of AUD. 
 
3. Explanatory integration beyond reduction 
                                                             
3 Like one of Smith’s (1998) participants says: “I thought if I tried just drinking half of this bottle today, and 
that’s the half for the next day. I painted a big thick line on the bottle. It never worked because the second 
you got down to that line you said, well I might as well just finish it” (218). 
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Integrating two or more accounts of a phenomenon consists in combining the concepts, evidence, 
results, or methods involved in those accounts into one integral explanatory account. The resulting 
integrated account explains different aspects of the phenomenon, displaying how such aspects are 
logically, probabilistically, constitutively, or causally related. To the extent an explanatory account 
is integrated, it yields understanding of the phenomenon as a multifaceted whole. 
 
An integrated explanatory account of some target phenomenon requires some kind of dependence 
(e.g., logical, probabilistic, constitutive, or causal dependence) between the accounts to be 
integrated. If two accounts are fully independent, and they do not display any logical, statistical, 
evidential or conceptual dependence, then they cannot be integrated in an explanatory account. If 
they are fully independent, the two accounts are mutually irrelevant, and each would be 
unconstrained by the evidence, concepts, results or methods, on which the other account relies. Two 
accounts are independent to the extent they each enjoy many epistemic autonomies to a great 
degree. An account of a given phenomenon can enjoy different kinds of epistemic autonomies with 
respect to another account of the same phenomenon. Specifically, 
 
(i) autonomy in the selection and use of taxonomic categories 
(ii) autonomy in the selection of theoretical vocabulary 
(iii) autonomy in the choice of methods of investigation 
(iv) autonomy in the selection of and weight given to relevant evidence 
 
If an account does not enjoy any of these autonomies with respect to another, then the relationship 
between the two accounts is one of full dependence. 
 
Full dependence between accounts in the science of mind and brain is generally understood in terms 
of a “classical” notion of reduction. Different strategies for scientific reduction have been 
developed in the philosophy of science (e.g., Nagel 1961; Schaffner 1993; Bickle 2006). Although 
these strategies aim at establishing that a certain phenomenon (entity, property, or process) is 
identical to or fully explained by another, more basic phenomenon (entity, property, or process), or 
that a certain account (concept, model, or theory) can be logically derived from another more basic 
account, they all share at least the assumptions that phenomena and their scientific study belong in 
different “levels”, and that the concepts of a reduced explanatory approach should be connectable to 
the concepts of the reducing explanatory approach. 
 
While it’s often claimed that “reductionism has dominated both research directions and funding 
policies in clinical psychology and psychiatry” (Borsboom, Cramer, & Kalis 2018),4 actual attempts 
at reducing particular psychiatric phenomena to lower-level neural, molecular, or genetic 
underpinnings are sparse, “patchy” and “partial” (cf., Schaffner 2013). As Schaffner (2013, 1018) 
explains, “[i]n the past fifty years, a reductionistic approach in the biomedical sciences and in 
psychology has become far less imperialistic and considerably more fragmented and tentative”. So, 
                                                             
4 Borsboom, Cramer and Kalis (2018) argue that if a symptom network modelling approach to understanding 
and treating mental maladies is the correct approach, then reductionism in psychiatry is false. One of the 
assumptions of this argument is that a network approach is incompatible with a causal modelling approach 
aimed at inferring common (latent) causes of observed correlations between symptoms. Their argument 
seems then to equate reduction of a set of symptoms of a mental malady to a set of neurobiological structures 
and inference of a “latent” cause of a set of symptoms of a mental malady. But this is confusing, since the 
network approach, which Borsboom, Cramer and Kalis (2018) advertise, is compatible with a causal 
modelling approach aimed at inferring common (latent) causes of observed correlations between symptoms 
(Bringmann & Eronen 2018). Furthermore, reduction relationships typically hold between models or 
theories, and successfully inferring to a latent cause of a symptom does not entail the symptom has thereby 
been reduced to that cause. 
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because reductionism does not obviously offer an adequate framework for integrating different 
accounts in psychiatry in a way that comports with successful inter-field explanatory practices, we 
leave it on the side. 
 
3.1 Dimensional computational phenotypes 
Lying in between full independence and dependence, there are several intermediate positions, which 
involve relationships of partial dependence or mutual constraint (Kaplan 2017). One increasingly 
popular framework in psychiatry (Montague et al. 2012; Heinz 2017) appeals to David Marr’s 
(1982) three-level framework for analysing information-processing systems. The computational 
level specifies what input-output function the system computes and why that type of system ought 
to compute that function. The algorithmic level specifies the effective procedures and 
representations employed by the system. The implementation level specifies how those procedures 
and representations are physically realized in the system. 
 
Reinforcement Learning (RL) approaches to computational modelling have been blooming in 
psychiatry in the last few years (Maia & Frank 2011; Adams, Huys & Roiser 2016). Within RL, the 
computational level specifies the problem of learning what to do in an unfamiliar environment so as 
to maximize a numerical reward signal (Sutton & Barto 1998). Model-free control and model-based 
control are two families of RL algorithms that can be used to solve this problem. Model-based 
control algorithms learn a model of the environment, which they use to compute the expected value 
of possible actions by simulating their consequences. Model-based control produces more accurate 
and flexible decisions than model-free control, but is also computationally expensive, since it 
requires the agent to simulate future possibilities. Model-free algorithms do not exploit and search 
any model of the environment; they just store the long-run expected value of each action, 
computing them on-line, on the basis of a reward prediction error, the difference between 
predictions about the reward obtained by taking a certain action in a given state and the rewards 
actually received. Model-free control is less computationally costly than model-based control, but 
produces relatively inflexible decisions, which are similar to habits. If the agent’s motivational state 
changes, or the structure of the environment changes, then the values “cached” by a model-free 
algorithm may be outdated and produce maladaptive choices. At the level of implementation, a 
wealth of neurobiological evidence suggests that the phasic activity of dopaminergic neurons in the 
basal ganglia encode prediction error signals that are recruited by the cortical-basal ganglia circuit 
for model-free (Montague, Dayan & Sejnowski 1996; Colombo 2014), and model-based control too 
(Langdon et al. 2018). 
 
Relying on RL modelling, psychiatrists have started to identify possible computational phenotypes 
of mental maladies. Computational phenotypes are measurable behavioural, psychological and 
neural types defined in terms of specific parameters extracted from specific computational models 
of a given task on the basis of behavioural, psychological, and neurophysiological data (Montague, 
Dolan, Friston, & Dayan 2012; Patzelt, Hartley & Gershman 2018). As we’ll explain below in 
Section 4.3, one clinically relevant5 computational phenotype is a parameter that controls the trade-
                                                             
5 What’s clinically relevant is a function of the “disease,” “illness,” and “sickness” aspects of a possible 
mental malady (Heinz 2017, 6). “Disease” refers to a  biological, or psychological abnormality that is 
causally implicated in maladaptive behaviour, such as dampened dopaminergic firings, ineffective reward-
based learning, and memory impairment in alcohol-dependent patients. “Illness” refers to the subjective 
experience of a malady, such as a sense of anxiety and bodily suffering in AUD. And “sickness” refers to 
impairment in social participation, where a person may be unable to learn and comply with local social 
norms, to communicate or interact smoothly with other people. 
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off between model-based and model-free processes in humans (Daw et al. 2011).6 A range of 
psychiatric symptoms central to both AUD and many compulsive disorders has been associated 
with values of this phenotype, where model-based control is reduced in favour of model-free 
control (Gillian et al. 2016; Sebold et al. 2017; Voon et al. 2017). 
 
Computational phenotypes can ground a dimensional framework for explanatory integration in 
psychiatry, which we’ll display in Section 4.3 below. It is important to clarify already that, similarly 
to the dimensional approach taken by the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDoC) initiative of the 
National Institute of Mental Health (National Institute of Mental Health 2010), dimensional 
approaches like ours assert that mental maladies should be understood as quantitatively, rather than 
qualitatively different from non-pathological psychological functions. Unlike the RDoC, our 
proposal does not assume that all mental maladies must have a localizable neurophysiological 
correlate; their organic correlate might be widely distributed and have diffuse effects at multiple 
spatial and temporal scales. And, unlike the RDoC, we do not subscribe to the idea that different 
levels of psychological function should be defined on the basis of genetic or neurophysiological 
dysfunction (Insel et al. 2010, 749). We propose instead that different levels of a psychological 
function should be defined more abstractly, in terms of different levels of a computational 
phenotype, and that mental maladies should be conceived as regions of the mathematical space 
defined by a set of clinically relevant computational phenotypes (e.g., balance between model-based 
and model-free control, delay discounting, learning rate, sensitivity to other agents’ mental states). 
 
In summary, our dimensional framework conceives of mental maladies as regions of the space 
defined by the computational phenotypes, understands levels as Marr’s levels of analysis of a target 
computing system, and pursues explanatory integration by uncovering the common computational 
structure of apparently different maladies. 
 
3.2 Mechanisms 
Though Marr (1982, 25) claimed “the three levels are only rather loosely related” and emphasised 
the top-level as “critically important from the information-processing point of view” (27), in fact 
each one of Marr’s three levels places taxonomic, theoretical, and evidential constraints on the other 
two levels of analysis (Colombo 2015, Sec. 4). Paying special attention to the implementation (or 
mechanistic) level, some have argued that Marr’s levels “are just different aspects of the same 
mechanistic explanation” (Piccinini & Craver 2011, 303), and that explanatory integration in the 
mind and brain sciences should be grounded in the notion of a mechanism (Craver 2007). 
 
Within the mechanistic framework, explanatory integration proceeds by revealing multi-level 
mechanisms responsible for phenomena. Mechanistic levels are levels of organization (not 
analysis), and are not individuated on the basis of considerations concerning scientific 
representation. The mechanism and its causal activities are at a higher level than the mechanism’s 
constitutive component parts and operations; and, in turn, the mechanism’s component parts and 
operations are at a higher level than their sub-components. The relationship between mechanistic 
levels is one of physical constitution, not causation; and talk of levels in this framework refers to 
part-whole relationships within mechanisms. 
 
Mechanistic integration of different levels proceed by decomposing a system believed to be 
responsible for a phenomenon into its functionally relevant components, and by localizing which 
function is performed by which physical component when the mechanism produces the 
                                                             
6 Specifically, this computational phenotype corresponds to the parameter ω in the following component of a 
hybrid, model-based and model-free algorithm for computing the Q-value of state and action pairs: Q(s, a) = 
ωQMB(s, a) + (1−ω)QMF(s, a) (Daw et al. 2011, Supplemental Experimental Procedures). 
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phenomenon (Bechtel & Richardson 2010). According to this approach, integrating different 
mechanistic levels of explanation consists in decomposing, localizing, and recomposing a 
mechanism with the aim of displaying how entities and operations at many different levels are 
related to one another and contribute to the production of the target phenomenon to be explained.7 
 
Within the mechanistic framework, Kendler, Zachar & Craver (2011) individuate mental maladies 
with mechanistic property clusters, that is: clusters of properties underlain, produced, supported or 
maintained by a mechanism. This view entails that explanatory integration of computational 
accounts and phenomenological analyses is successful to the extent such accounts can each reveal 
structures that produce, underlie and maintain a mental malady (Kendler 2008; Murphy 2013). 
Kaplan (2011, 347) captures this commitment in terms of a “model-mechanism-mapping 
constraint,” whereby a model of a phenomenon has explanatory power to the extent that: “(a) the 
variables in the model correspond to identifiable components, activities, and organizational features 
of the target mechanism that produces, maintains, or underlies the phenomenon, and (b) the 
(perhaps mathematical) dependencies posited among these (perhaps mathematical) variables in the 
model correspond to causal relations among the components of the target mechanism.” Compliance 
with this constraint would guarantee that different accounts of a target mental malady combine 
concepts, results, and methods to uncover a single mechanism responsible for the malady. 
 
In summary, Kendler, Zachar & Craver’s (2011) mechanistic framework conceives of mental 
maladies as property cluster mechanisms, understands levels as levels of physical organization 
within a mechanism, and pursues explanatory integration by combining concepts, results and 
methods from different fields in the service of discovering the mechanism responsible for a malady. 
 
3.3 Networks of symptoms 
Borsboom & Cramer’s (2013) network of symptoms framework is another prominent approach for 
explanatory integration in psychiatry. Unlike the mechanistic framework, the network of symptoms 
framework understands psychiatric maladies as alternative, stable states of networks of strongly 
connected symptoms. These networks of symptoms need not have a common mechanism that’s 
causing them. Symptoms here are not indicators of some underlying condition that causes them, but 
are understood as interconnected variables that are constitutive of mental maladies. The network of 
symptoms framework pursues explanatory integration in psychiatry by constructing networks of 
symptoms that reflect interdependencies between various neurobiological, psychological, 
behavioural, social and cultural symptoms (Borsboom, Cramer, & Kalis 2018). 
 
Symptoms can be activated by external conditions, for example by the presence of empty bottles of 
beer in the environment; they can also be triggered by internal states, such as when steroids 
interfere with synaptic plasticity to impair long term potentiation in the hippocampus causes a 
“blackout” (Wetherill & Fromme 2016). As the network strategy understands symptoms as 
statistically and causally connected variables that can change over time, activation of some 
symptom can cause activation (or suppression) of some other symptom. When certain symptoms in 
a network are co-active and have the appropriate causal strength, a mental malady emerges. 
 
In summary, Borsboom & Cramer’s (2013) network of symptoms framework conceives of mental 
maladies as stable, interacting symptoms without an underlying common cause, posits no levels of 
organization where different symptoms would lie, and pursues explanatory integration by 
                                                             
7 While the mechanistic framework does not entail a commitment to either reductionism or anti-
reductionism, many mechanists concerned with explanatory integration have criticized the idea that 
reduction should be understood as a relationship between theories or models, emphasising the importance of 
multilevel explanations grounded in the pursuit of mechanism discovery (Darden 2006).  
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constructing networks of symptoms studied in different fields and by holistically capturing the 
structure of the relationships between these symptoms. 
 
4. How to pursue explanatory integration in psychiatry 
We now examine some of the theoretical and practical virtues of the three frameworks for 
explanatory integration in psychiatry we have outlined, as well as their limitations. Our overall 
conclusion is that our dimensional framework grounded in the notion of computational  phenotype is 
the best for effectively integrating computational and mechanistic explanations with 
phenomenological analyses of mental maladies, in a way that comports with successful practices in 
psychiatry. 
 
4.1 Mechanistic integration of computation and phenomenology 
Kendler, Zachar & Craver’s (2011) mechanistic framework has several attractions. It denies that 
mental maladies can be adequately understood as natural kinds defined in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. They argue mental maladies should instead be understood as mechanistic 
property clusters. These clusters consist of sets of varying symptoms that are produced, stabilized, 
and maintained by some mechanism. Mechanisms individuate mental maladies, and different 
properties of a mental malady—say, biological, psychological and behavioural properties—would 
be properties of a single mechanism, at different levels of organization. 
 
Although we are “far from being able to define plausible stability-producing mechanisms for most 
psychiatric disorders” (Kendler, Zachar & Craver 2011, 1148), one goal of current psychiatric 
practice is to discover and localize multiple, causal factors at different spatial and temporal scales 
that might constitute the mechanism of AUD. Such factors make a difference to whether a person 
compulsively seeks and takes alcohol, loses control in limiting alcohol intake, and tends to have 
negative emotional states associated with craving for alcohol and withdrawal. The mechanistic 
framework does not privilege any particular level of organization. The level of brain physiology, for 
example, is implicated in AUD, where alcoholic patients show decreased level of dopaminergic 
signalling in the ventral striatum, and increase of the corticotropin-releasing factor in the amygdala 
(e.g., Chen et al. 2011). 
 
Despite these virtues, the mechanistic framework shows some theoretical and practical limitations 
in helping psychiatrists to pursue explanatory integration of mechanisms with computational and 
phenomenological accounts. Consider phenomenological methods. One of their common aims is to 
elucidate the structure of subjective intentional experiences, which cannot be detached from the 
whole circumstance of an embodied, ecologically situated patient. So, one of their aims is to 
provide patients, psychiatrists or therapists with a holistic account of the structure of the experience 
involved in a mental malady; and the pursuit of this aim plays distinctive roles in successful 
practices of diagnosis, sense-making and therapy (Parnas & Sass 2008). Instead, mechanistic 
strategies like those suggested by Kendler, Zachar & Craver (2011) aim at explaining mental 
maladies in terms of the decomposable and localizable parts and operations of a mechanism that 
produces and maintains a cluster of symptoms. If the mechanistic strategies and phenomenological 
methods make inconsistent assumptions about mental maladies—the former assume that mental 
maladies can be spatially decomposed and localize, while the latter assume they cannot—then they 
enjoy a high degree of autonomy. To the extent the methods of phenomenology play a helpful role 
for successful diagnosis and therapy of mental maladies, the mechanistic framework is inadequate 
for integrating phenomenology in an overall account of a malady of interest. 
 
This leads us to the second limitation of Kendler, Zachar & Craver’s (2011) mechanistic 
framework: at best, within a mechanistic framework, conscious experiences contribute to put into 
focus what need to be explained with the vocabulary and taxonomies of sciences aiming at 
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discovering the mechanisms of mental maladies. Phenomenological taxonomies—for example, 
subjective descriptions of the “ontological insecurity” experienced by alcohol-dependent patients—
can be considered subjective, personal-level descriptions of pathological, sub-personal mechanisms 
giving rise to cravings (cf., Colombo 2013 on addiction and the personal/sub-personal distinction). 
These descriptions can contribute to elucidate the nature of the malady to be explained, but they do 
not provide a constraint on the adequacy of mechanistic accounts, which ultimately appeal to 
different taxonomies from genetics, neuroscience, psychology, and ethology. For, generally, 
phenomenological descriptions do not reliably map onto the types of entities and processes posited 
by mechanistic accounts. For example, some alcohol-dependent patients experience of time and 
temporal relationships as “circular”—as long as drinking continues, the future is just a re-enactment 
of the past, and future outcomes are just as valuable as past ones (Thune 1977)—but this 
experienced circularity does not map in any meaningful way onto the temporal relationships 
displayed by their neural processes. Because phenomenological descriptions and mechanistic 
accounts enjoy a relatively high degree of taxonomic autonomy, the mechanistic framework i s 
theoretically inadequate for pursuing explanatory integration of mechanisms with 
phenomenological analyses. 
 
If, within Kendler, Zachar & Craver’s (2011) mechanistic framework, phenomenology enjoys too 
high a degree of methodological and conceptual autonomy, computational accounts enjoy too little 
autonomy, in a way that does not comport with successful practices in psychiatry and other sciences 
of mind and brain. Computational models are conceived of as “elliptical or incomplete mechanistic 
explanations” within the mechanistic framework (Piccinini & Craver 2011, 284). Mechanist 
philosophers focus their attention on the level of biological implementation, on which the 
explanatory value of accounts at Marr’s algorithmic and computational levels would depend. But 
successful practices in psychiatry as well as in other sciences of mind and brain show that 
computational models need not map onto biological mechanisms to be practically useful in a variety 
of clinical and research contexts, to answer counterfactual questions and unify different phenomena 
under the same computational description (see, e.g., Chirimuuta 2018; Weiskopf 2018). This 
suggests that computational models should not be understood as mechanistic sketches: their 
explanatory value does not completely depend on their capacity to uncover mechanisms; it also 
suggests that the taxonomies employed at the computational and algorithmic levels of analysis 
should enjoy “soft” constraints with respect to the details of physical implementation, as 
computational analyses and algorithmic models do not make any claim about the spatial localization 
and organization of the components they posit, which may be implemented in multiple physical 
mechanisms (Elber-Dorozko & Shagrir 2019). 
 
Voon et al. (2017) offers an example of the explanatory and taxonomic autonomies computational 
models should enjoy with respect to mechanism. Voon and collaborators review several lines of 
evidence that indicate the clinical and translational relevance of RL model-based control across 
multiple psychiatric disorders with different underlying mechanisms, including binge eating 
disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and AUD. Specifically, self-reported severity of alcohol 
use has been found to be associated with impairments in model-based control (Gillan et al. 2016), 
treatment outcome abstinence duration (Voon et al. 2015); the interaction between reduced model-
based control and high expectations about the positive effects of alcohol has been found to predict 
risk of relapse (Sebold et al. 2017). Furthermore, computational modelling of the balance between 
model-free and model-based control provides a theoretical foundation for therapeutic interventions 
that aim to increase model-based control and inhibit model-free processes underlying temptation 
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and societal pressure, such as training at cognitive bias modification8, which has been found to 
improve treatment outcome (Wiers et al. 2011; Heinz et al. 2017; see also Moutoussis et al. 2018). 
 
This body of evidence indicates that a specific computational phenotype—viz. balance between 
model-based and model-free control in learning tasks—can unify apparently different compulsive 
disorders. It also indicates that computational models can support some counterfactual predictions 
about treatment outcome and risk of relapse. While model-based control has been associated with 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and caudate activity, and model-based computation shares a 
dopaminergic foundation with model-free control (Deserno et al. 2015), the success of 
computational phenotypes in unifying apparently different disorders and supporting counterfactual 
predictions does not obviously depend on their mapping onto specific neural structures. If Kendler, 
Zachar & Craver’s (2011) mechanistic framework does not acknowledge the relative degree of 
explanatory and taxonomic autonomies of computational models, then it cannot adequately 
integrate computational accounts in explanatory accounts psychiatry. 
 
4.2 Network integration of computation and phenomenology 
Borsboom & Cramer’s (2013) network of symptoms framework presents many attractive features 
too. It eschews ill-defined talk of levels, as well as the simplistic identification of mental maladies 
with neurobiological states. Although the covariance between symptoms in a network can warrant 
causal conclusions about a target mental malady, and can thus uncover variables for intervention, 
these conclusions don’t assume the covariance between symptoms arises from some common latent 
causes (Borsboom, Cramer & Kalis 2018). In this sense, Borsboom & Cramer’s (2013) network of 
symptoms framework is “flat”: it does not seek to uncover causes of symptoms at different levels of 
organization. Different features of a mental malady—say, craving, positive expectations about the 
outcomes of drinking, or reduced dopaminergic firing—are integrated as different interconnected 
nodes in a “flat” network structure. This kind of integration highlights statistical (or causal) patterns 
of heterogeneous variables that characterise a mental malady, while it can offer plausible accounts 
of comorbidity, in a way that comports with the more holistic methods of phenomenology. 
 
Despite its attractions, Borsboom & Cramer’s (2013) network of symptoms framework doesn’t 
adequately integrate computational accounts and phenomenology. Within this framework, 
computational phenotypes, mechanisms, and phenomenological analyses enjoy a relatively high 
degree of conceptual, evidential and methodological autonomy. Consider phenomenological  
descriptions. Though Borsboom and Cramer (2013) and Borsboom, Cramer & Kalis (2018) do not 
address this point, phenomenology might at best constrain networks of symptoms indirectly. In fact, 
Borsboom, Cramer & Kalis (2018) argue that the covariation between symptoms in a network “can 
be seen to make sense” (20), because symptoms often correspond to intentional mental states, that 
is, to mental states that are about something. For example, the desire to drink alcohol is about 
drinking alcohol. Since intentional mental states display “a rational relation,” Borsboom and 
colleagues suggest that networks of symptoms allow us to understand the lived experience involved 
in a malady. While this suggestion is a promising start, it falls short of providing a convincing 
answer to the question of how phenomenological descriptions or analyses fit or constrain a network 
of symptoms structure. After all, many phenomenological analyses of AUD experiences are focused 
on “pre-intentional” mental states like moods that need not be about any specific object in the 
world. Moods can be understood as providing subjects of experience with a background sense that 
                                                             
8 This type of training is based on computer tasks performed with a joystick. The joystick is used to push 
alcohol-related images on the screen away and to pull images of water and alcohol-free beverages closer. 
When an image is pushed away, it becomes smaller; when it is pulled closer, it becomes larger. Alcohol-
dependent patients taking this training in addition to normal behavioural therapy have a lower chance of 
relapse in comparison to patients who don’t undergo this training. 
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structures their engagements with the environment infusing them with meaning (Heidegger 1962, 
176; Jaspers 1913/1997, 688ff). 
 
Even if a phenomenological description or analysis of AUD included only intentional states, it’s far 
from obvious how their “rational” relationships within a network of symptoms should be specified. 
Specifying them in terms of logical or semantic relationships might be a promising route, but it’s 
likely these relationships may not always track the causal relationships uncovered by network 
analysis. For example, some phenomenological description like Smith’s (1998) and Flanagan’s 
(2013) highlight that several alcohol-dependent patients truly believe that drinking will not make 
their suffering disappear and genuinely desire to stop drinking; yet, an overwhelming majority of 
alcohol-dependent patients will relapse within their first year of sobriety (Beck et al. 2012). Unless 
a network of symptoms include other mental states that could explain and rationalize the apparent 
inconsistency between relapse and the conscious belief that one should remain abstinent and desire 
that one remains abstinent, rational and causal relationships in the network will present a mismatch. 
And this mismatch will not promote “sense-making” of the lived experiences involved in AUD. 
 
The network of symptoms framework can include nodes corresponding to computational 
phenotypes. But, because Borsboom & Cramer’s (2013) network of symptoms framework is meant 
to be “flat,” it does not take account of the organizational relationships between the neurobiological 
components and causal activities that physically realize computational parameters and algorithmic 
transformations. Nor does the network of symptoms framework specify how the transformations 
posited at Marr’s algorithmic level relate to what a system is computing and why the system is 
computing that function instead of another. So, this framework—to the extent it pits itself against 
latent variable (or common cause) models, which it need not do (Bringmann & Eronen 2018)—
cannot integrate computational accounts of mental maladies. 
 
Consider variables that correspond to entities and causal activities that realize a computational 
phenotype like the balance between model-based and model-free control. Some of these variables 
(e.g., level of dopamine release in the ventral striatum) are likely to be common causes of 
psychiatric symptoms (e.g., inflexible learning and craving for alcohol in certain environments). But 
one of the assumptions of Borsboom, Cramer & Kalis (2018) is that a network approach is 
incompatible with a causal modelling approach aimed at inferring common (latent) causes of 
observed correlations between symptoms; they claim: “If a network model is correct... there exists 
no common cause” (17). Despite this claim, however, network and latent variable models should 
not be seen as providing competing accounts, and instead should be considered as complementary 
strategies for understanding and treating mental maladies. Networks of symptoms can gain “depth” 
and allow for the integration of information about Marr’s different levels of analysis, by using 
representations of networks that encompass latent variable structures (see e.g.  Epskamp, Rhemtulla 
& Borsboom 2017), and that show how causal transactions between organized sets of variables 
systematically relate to computational transformations of information. 
 
4.3 Dimensional integration of computation and phenomenology 
Conceptualizing mental maladies in terms of dimensional computational phenotypes allows us to 
unify apparently different diagnostic categories on the basis of their common dimensional 
computational structure. Within a space of computational phenotypes, we can also answer 
counterfactual questions concerning how social behaviour, neural activity, and subjective 
experience would change, had the value of a certain computational phenotype defining that space 
changed. These are two reasons why computational phenotypes have explanatory power. Let us 
now put into focus the notion of a computational phenotype, and consider how a dimensional 
framework grounded in this notion can help psychiatrists pursue the integration of mechanistic and 
computational explanations with phenomenological accounts of mental maladies. 
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As we already mentioned, computational phenotypes are types of parameters defined within a 
computational model of a task (Montague, Dolan, Friston, & Dayan 2012; Patzelt, Hartley & 
Gershman 2018). Computational phenotypes include such model parameters as rate of learning, 
which controls the extent to which new information overrides old information, delay discounting, 
which determines the extent to which the present value of a reward is discounted with delay of its 
receipt, loss aversion, which controls the preference to avoid losses to acquiring equivalent gains, 
and depth of reasoning, which controls to what extent one considers the thoughts of other people in 
strategic reasoning. 
 
Computational phenotypes are continuous parameters and define types of continuous (or 
dimensional) psychological functions. A set of computational phenotypes can be used to define an 
abstract space of human phenotypes, that is, a space of types of individuals who share modes of 
behaviour and information processing for a wide range of decision and learning scenarios.  For 
example, AUD might correspond to a region of the space defined by delay discounting, learning 
rate and trade-off between model-based and model-free control. The choice of computational 
phenotypes most relevant to define a certain dimensional space for a target malady depends on 
evidence available about an individual’s psychological and neurobiological dysfunctions, on the 
individual’s level of social participation, and on the individual’s affective life. It also depends on 
the practical clinical needs, and on clinicians’ phenomenological insights into the condition of a 
patient. 
 
Now, how does a space defined over dimensional computational phenotypes exactly promote 
explanatory integration in a way that is more theoretically adequate and practically useful than 
Kendler, Zachar & Craver’s (2011) mechanistic framework and Borsboom & Cramer’s (2013) 
network of symptoms framework? 
 
Let’s start from mechanism, clarifying the main differences between our own proposal and Kendler, 
Zachar & Craver’s (2011). First, we do not assume an account of a mental malady is adequate to the 
extent it uncovers its neurobiological mechanism; unlike the mechanistic framework, we assume an 
integrative explanatory account should be judged in terms of practical success, not in terms of its 
ability to latch onto mechanisms that exist independently of human theorizing. Second, 
computational modelling enjoys a relative higher degree of autonomy within our framework; 
though it constrains and it is constrained by available mechanistic evidence, computational analyses 
and algorithmic models are not sketches of neurobiological mechanisms. Third and finally, and that, 
on our view, types of mental maladies are in part individuated on the basis of human classificatory 
practices, in particular practices involving computational and phenomenological analyses. 
 
Computation and neural mechanisms can obviously be integrated within our dimensional 
framework. In keeping with Marr’s three levels of analysis, computational phenotypes are realized 
by neurobiological mechanisms that transform exteroceptive, proprioceptive, or interoceptive inputs 
into behavioural, emotional, or cognitive outputs. Given that a computational phenotype such as 
balance between model-based and model-free control is extracted from a computational model on 
the basis of behavioural and neural data, different values of this phenotype will be associated with 
different environmental stimuli, but also different levels of activity in certain neural circuits in the 
medial prefrontal cortex, also in alcohol-dependent patients (Daw et al. 2011; Deserno et al. 2015; 
Sebold et al. 2017). More importantly, the trade-off between model-based and model-free processes 
towards model-free control can be a computational phenotype of a range of disorders underlain by 
different mechanisms but all involving compulsion or drug abuse (Gillan et al. 2016; Voon et al. 
2017). In this way, dimensional computational phenotyping can ground a unified explanation of 
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several kinds of addictions beyond AUD, displaying their common computational structure within a 
certain space of computational phenotypes. 
 
Consider phenomenology. Berrios and Marková (2013) argue that a dimensional approach to 
psychiatry is misguided and cannot integrate phenomenological analyses or descriptions. Their 
argument is that a dimensional approach to some phenomenon entails the possibility of measuring 
that phenomenon by concretely interacting with it. Because, according to Berrios and Marková, 
mental symptoms have “abstract” or “ideal attributes (meanings),” which cannot be measured, 
“mental symptoms can only be evaluated (not measured)” (78). 
 
Berrios and Marková’s (2013) argument is inconclusive. A dimensional approach to some 
phenomenon does not entail that that phenomenon must be measurable via interaction or must be a 
concrete object. Sets are not concrete objects; yet, their cardinality can be measured. In fact, 
measurement and dimensionality often involve the representation of ideal systems, such as the 
consumption of alcohol in the average household in a certain neighbourhood in a country. 
Furthermore, measurement theory is a heterogeneous field, where different authors with different 
epistemic commitments, understand the nature of the relata of an act of quantitative measurement 
differently. Regardless of the nature of the relata of measurements, Berrios and Marková’s (2013) 
argument is at odds with the fruitfulness of psychometric and dimensional approaches to 
understanding mental maladies (cf., Hägele et al 2015; Heinz et al 2016). What’s correct in Berrios 
and Marková’s (2013) suggestion is that psychiatric research often involves phenomenological 
description, analysis, and interpretation of subjective experiences of suffering that cannot obviously 
be measured only with questionnaires, scales, experimental tasks, or bodily measurements. 
 
Our dimensional computational framework, however, is responsive to phenomenological 
descriptions and analyses of mental maladies in two ways. First, Marr (1982, 22) says that “the    
most abstract is the level of what the device does and why”. What a system does and why it does 
that instead of something else contribute to delineating the phenomenon to be explained (Shagrir 
2010). Within our framework, phenomenological analyses and descriptions are charged with 
helping us specify what a system is meant to accomplish within a certain ecological context, in a 
way that demonstrates the aptness of what the system does in that ecology. For example, Laing’s 
(1960) analysis of ontological insecurity displays psychoses as essentially bound up with one’s 
sense of “ontological insecurity”, where one feels they are losing their sense of self, reality, and 
meaningful social relationships. While ontological insecurity can usher in anxiety, withdrawal and 
avoidance, this concept can helpfully illuminate the phenomenon to be explained and its ecological 
constraints. A computational-level hypothesis informed by Laing’s phenomenological analysis of 
ontological insecurity is that alcohol-dependent patients may fail to integrate afferent interoceptive 
and exteroceptive representations with self-referential representations. Couched in mathematical 
terms, this hypothesis can then be specified algorithmically, and tested in the light of behavioural 
and neural data. 
 
Second and more generally, phenomenological analyses and descriptions can provide patients and 
clinicians with narrative glue that may help patients make sense of the relationship between their 
suffering and their computational phenotypes. The abstract, non-biological taxonomies of 
computational models can be more readily re-interpreted than mechanistic accounts in terms of 
phenomenological categories. These categories may help one see how different computational 
phenotypes might be related and may reflect one’s lived experience of choices and perceptions of 
reality. They may help patients and their beloved answer “existential” questions about the point of 
the suffering involved in their malady (cf., Roberts 2000). 
 
15 
 
One important objection to our proposal is that rather than offering an alternative explanatory 
framework, what we are proposing just changes the topic: unlike the mechanistic and network of 
symptoms frameworks, our dimensional framework only re-defines the explanandum (i.e., mental 
maladies); it does not explain why or how mental maladies come about. 
 
To address this objection, it’s helpful to draw an analogy. Different quantities suffice to physically 
characterise a system. For example, if you want to characterize a spring undergoing simple 
harmonic motion, its mass, period, and the acceleration of gravity suffice (plus a constant k 
determined by Hooke’s law). These quantities have dimensions. The dimension of the period of a 
pendulum is time [T]; the dimension of mass is [M]; the dimension of the acceleration of gravity is 
length divided by the square of a time, [L/T2]; and the dimension of the constant k is [M/T2]. If we 
want to know why the spring has a certain period of oscillation, then we can derive the dimensional 
structure of the spring by working out an equation that gives us one quantity of interest as a function 
of all the quantities on which that quantity depends. From knowledge of the dimensional structure 
of the spring, we can conclude that the period P is proportional to the square root of mass divided 
by k. 
 
This type of dimensional analysis is commonplace in physics, and it allows us to find the functional 
relationships between a set of quantities. These functional relationships can provide us with 
information about why apparently different systems behave similarly by considering the common 
dimensional structure they share (Lange 2009). It also allows us to gain modal information about 
the behaviour of a system by allowing us to answer counterfactual questions about how change in 
some quantity of a system would influence change in some other quantity of that system. As Pexton 
(2014) puts it, this type of “[d]imensional explanation is not simply about reading off dimensions 
naturalistically from a system and combining them to get functional forms of dependence between 
variables. Rather it implicitly involves picking a conceptualisation of a target system that in part 
creates a perspective from which the dimensional architecture is constructed” (2350). 
 
Now, in the current state of research in computational psychiatry, we are far from being able to 
specify a plausible set of computational phenotypes for most mental maladies. And computational 
phenotypes do not have any obvious dimension we are familiar with from physics; their dimensions 
need to be clarified within computational psychiatry and value theory. Yet, by using a dimensional 
structure defined by a set of computational phenotypes relevant to a target mental malady, we can 
not only represent what the malady might consist of. As we already pointed out, we can also see 
that apparently different mental maladies present a common dimensional computational structure. 
In this way, computational phenotyping can help psychiatrists understand what clusters of 
symptoms are produced by the same type of processes, and to what extent these processes are 
realized by common types of neurobiological mechanisms. 
 
Furthermore, using a dimensional structure defined by a set of computational phenotypes allows us 
to gain clinically relevant, modal information about a mental malady. In particular, it can give us 
information about clinical heterogeneity and about possible targets for treatment. For example, 
Heinz et al. (2017) suggest that if impaired model-based control is a key computational phenotype 
of AUD that predicts relapse, then interventions aimed to enhance model-based vs. model-free 
control on the basis of behavioural and cognitive training, or pharmacological manipulations will be 
promising therapeutic strategies for treating AUD (see also Moutoussis et al. 2018). In this way, 
computational phenotyping involves models connecting change-relating variables that allow 
psychiatrists to answer counterfactual questions generated by an explanandum mental malady. 
 
Conclusion 
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One of the aims of psychiatry is explanatory integration. How can different concepts, sources of 
evidence, and methods used in different fields be integrated to adequately explain why a certain 
mental malady emerges and how it can be effectively treated? In this paper, we have started to 
articulate a dimensional theoretical structure based on the notion of computational phenotypes of 
mental maladies to pursue explanatory integration in psychiatry. Examining the case of AUD, we 
have shown how our dimensional framework can structure the search for tailored treatments 
targeting patients’ expectations, social environment, computational modes of control, and 
neurophysiology. Our proposal is compatible with attractive aspects of alternative frameworks for 
explanatory integration in psychiatry, like RDoC (Insel et al. 2010), Kendler, Zachar & Craver’s 
(2011) mechanistic framework, and Borsboom & Cramer’s (2013) network of symptoms 
frameworks; but, unlike these frameworks, our dimensional proposal allows us to more adequately 
integrate mechanism, computation and phenomenology in pursuing general explanatory accounts of 
mental maladies. 
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